Metacognitive Feelings, self-ascriptions and mental actions

ABSTRACT: The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feelings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our mental actions are often guided by our E-fee...

Full description

Autores:
Arango Muñoz, Santiago
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2014
Institución:
Universidad de Antioquia
Repositorio:
Repositorio UdeA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:bibliotecadigital.udea.edu.co:10495/32718
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/10495/32718
Palabra clave:
Emociones (filosofía)
Emotions (Philosophy)
Metacognición
Metacognition
Feelings
Mental Actions
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/