Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity
This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex p...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2008
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22182
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9031-2
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22182
- Palabra clave:
- Dual-self model
Myopia
Social security
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)