Governance of family firms
We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholder...
- Autores:
-
Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio CESA
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5116
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
- Palabra clave:
- Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
- Rights
- License
- Acceso Restringido