Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract

Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la...

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Autores:
Acosta, Benedicto
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2024
Institución:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Repositorio:
Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25371
Acceso en línea:
https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25371
https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.12
Palabra clave:
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
valores epistémicos,
innovación,
contrato social,
bases de datos,
incentivos
valores epistêmicos,
inovação,
contrato social,
bancos de dados,
incentivos
Rights
openAccess
License
Benedicto Acosta - 2024
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oai_identifier_str oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25371
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repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
spellingShingle Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
valores epistémicos,
innovación,
contrato social,
bases de datos,
incentivos
valores epistêmicos,
inovação,
contrato social,
bancos de dados,
incentivos
title_short Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_full Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_fullStr Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_full_unstemmed Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_sort Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Acosta, Benedicto
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Acosta, Benedicto
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
topic Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
valores epistémicos,
innovación,
contrato social,
bases de datos,
incentivos
valores epistêmicos,
inovação,
contrato social,
bancos de dados,
incentivos
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv valores epistémicos,
innovación,
contrato social,
bases de datos,
incentivos
valores epistêmicos,
inovação,
contrato social,
bancos de dados,
incentivos
description Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de los examinadores. Este estudio se basa principalmente en doce entrevistas en profundidad con examinadores de patentes españoles. La información analizada sugiere situaciones que pueden afectar la forma en que la tesis del contrato explica: (1) la difusión de la información y (2) los valores epistémicos que conducen a la innovación tecnológica.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
2025-04-09T17:48:01Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
2025-04-09T17:48:01Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-04
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0124-5996
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dc.relation.bitstream.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10062/17697
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10062/17698
dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 356
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv 52
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 341
dc.relation.citationvolume.spa.fl_str_mv 27
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv Revista de Economía Institucional
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Baruffaldi, S., & Raffo, J. (2017). “The geography of duplicated inventions: evidence from patent citations”. Regional Studies 51(8): 1232–1245.
Carrara, P., & Russo, D. (2017). “Patent searches opinion: How to minimize the risk when reviewing patent applications”. World Patent Information 49: 43–51.
Chang, H. F. (1995). “Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation”. RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1): 34–57.
Constitución Española (1978, Diciembre 29). Boletín Oficial del Estado. Diekmann, S., & Peterson, M. (2013). “The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models”. Science and Engineering Ethics 19: 207–218.
Drahos, P. (2010). The Global Governance of Knowledge. Patent Offices and their Clients. Cambridge University Press.
Eckert, A., & Langinier, C. (2014). “A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Procedures”. Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (5): 996–1015.
Eisenberg, R. (1989). “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use”. University of Chicago Law Review 56 (3): 1017–1086.
European Patent Office. (2012). Patent teaching kit – Protect your ideas. Munich. Retrieved from https://e-courses.epo.org/pluginfile.php/1428/mod_resource/content/1/data/cm1.pdf
Gallini, N., & Scotchmer, S. (2002). “Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 2: 51–77.
Griliches, Z. (1990). “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal of Economic Literature 28(4): 1661–1707.
Hegde, D., & Raj, M. (2019). “Does Gender Affect Work? Evidence from U.S. Patent Examination”. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339555
Huby, R., & Schenk, V. T. (1994). “Some problems in the translation of Japanese patents”. World Patent Information 16 (3): 154–158.
Kuhn, J. M. (2011). “Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem”. Yale Journal of Law and Technology 90: 89–140.
Langinier, C., & Marcoul, P. (2020). “Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners”. Journal of Economics and Business 110: 105906.
Larroyed, A. A. (2018). “Machine Translation and Disclosure of Patent Information”. IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 49 (7): 763–786.
Larroyed, A. A. (2019). Translation accuracy and dissemination of disclosure of patent information: an analysis of translation and its influence on patent law. Proefschrift Maken Maastricht.
Lemley, M. A., & Sampat, B. (2012). “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3): 817–827.
McMullin, E. (1982). “Values in Science”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2): 3–28.
Nagar, V., Schoenfeld, J., & Wellman, L. (2019). “The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67 (1): 36–57.
Nelson, R. R. (1989). “What Is Private and What Is Public About Technology?” Science, Technology, & Human Values 14 (3): 229–241.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). “An Economic Theory of Technological Change”. The American Economic Review 59 (2): 18–28.
OECD. (2005). Oslo Manual. OECD-EUROSTAT.
OEPM. (2013). Memoria de Actividades. Available at http://www.oepm.gob.es/export/sites/oepm/comun/documentos_relacionados/Memorias_de_Actividades_y_Estadisticas/Memorias_de_actividades/Memoria_de_Actividades_2013_ES.pdf
OEPM. (2018). “Entrevista a José Antonio Gil Celedonio, nuevo Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 62: 4–12.
OEPM. (2021). “Entrevista al Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 71: 2–10.
Ohms, J. (2021). “Current methodologies for chemical compound searching in patents: A case study”. World Patent Information 66: 102055.
Righi, C., & Simcoe, T. (2019). “Patent examiner specialization”. Research Policy 48 (1): 137–148.
Sáiz, P., & Amengual, R. (2018). “Do patents enable disclosure? Strategic innovation management of the four-stroke engine”. Industrial and Corporate Change 27 (6): 975–997.
Schuett, F. (2013). “Patent quality and incentives at the patent office”. The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (2): 313–336.
Silvast, A., Laes, E., Abram, S., & Bombaerts, G. (2020). “What do energy modellers know? An ethnography of epistemic values and knowledge models”. Energy Research & Social Science 66: 101495.
van Dulken, S. (2014). “Do you know English? The challenge of the English language for patent searchers”. World Patent Information 39: 35–40.
Wang, D. (2009). “Chinese to English automatic patent machine translation at SIPO”. World Patent Information 31 (2): 137–139.
Whitman, K. (2011). “Intellogist: An online community dedicated to comparing major patent search systems”. World Patent Information 33 (2): 168–179.
WIPO. (2021). World Intellectual Property Indicators 2021. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
Ying, C., Shuyu, Y., Jing, L., Lin, D., & Qi, Q. (2021). “Errors of Machine Translation of terminology in the patent text from English into Chinese”. ASP Transactions on Computers 1 (1): 12–17.
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spelling Acosta, Benedicto2024-12-04T15:17:53Z2025-04-09T17:48:01Z2024-12-04T15:17:53Z2025-04-09T17:48:01Z2024-12-04Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de los examinadores. Este estudio se basa principalmente en doce entrevistas en profundidad con examinadores de patentes españoles. La información analizada sugiere situaciones que pueden afectar la forma en que la tesis del contrato explica: (1) la difusión de la información y (2) los valores epistémicos que conducen a la innovación tecnológica.According to the social contract theory of patents, States grant commercial exclusivity to inventors in exchange for the disclosure of the technology, with the aim of enabling future innovations. The argument I will defend is that, under the rationale of the social contract theory, not being guided by certain epistemic values can contribute to a scenario in which disclosure of inventions does not enable technological innovation. First, I explain how the visibility and accessibility of the information disclosed can be affected by problems in databases and patent search engines. Second, I analyze how patent offices may not be encouraging searches and the training of the examiners. This study mainly relies on twelve in-depth interviews with Spanish patent examiners. The information analysed suggests situations that may affect the way in which the contract thesis explains: (1) the dissemination of information and (2) the epistemic values that lead to technological innovation.application/pdftext/html10.18601/01245996.v27n52.122346-24500124-5996https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25371https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.12spaUniversidad Externado de Colombiahttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10062/17697https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10062/17698Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio3565234127Revista de Economía InstitucionalBaruffaldi, S., & Raffo, J. (2017). “The geography of duplicated inventions: evidence from patent citations”. Regional Studies 51(8): 1232–1245.Carrara, P., & Russo, D. (2017). “Patent searches opinion: How to minimize the risk when reviewing patent applications”. World Patent Information 49: 43–51.Chang, H. F. (1995). “Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation”. RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1): 34–57.Constitución Española (1978, Diciembre 29). Boletín Oficial del Estado. Diekmann, S., & Peterson, M. (2013). “The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models”. Science and Engineering Ethics 19: 207–218.Drahos, P. (2010). The Global Governance of Knowledge. Patent Offices and their Clients. Cambridge University Press.Eckert, A., & Langinier, C. (2014). “A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Procedures”. Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (5): 996–1015.Eisenberg, R. (1989). “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use”. University of Chicago Law Review 56 (3): 1017–1086.European Patent Office. (2012). Patent teaching kit – Protect your ideas. Munich. Retrieved from https://e-courses.epo.org/pluginfile.php/1428/mod_resource/content/1/data/cm1.pdfGallini, N., & Scotchmer, S. (2002). “Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 2: 51–77.Griliches, Z. (1990). “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal of Economic Literature 28(4): 1661–1707.Hegde, D., & Raj, M. (2019). “Does Gender Affect Work? Evidence from U.S. Patent Examination”. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339555Huby, R., & Schenk, V. T. (1994). “Some problems in the translation of Japanese patents”. World Patent Information 16 (3): 154–158.Kuhn, J. M. (2011). “Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem”. Yale Journal of Law and Technology 90: 89–140.Langinier, C., & Marcoul, P. (2020). “Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners”. Journal of Economics and Business 110: 105906.Larroyed, A. A. (2018). “Machine Translation and Disclosure of Patent Information”. IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 49 (7): 763–786.Larroyed, A. A. (2019). Translation accuracy and dissemination of disclosure of patent information: an analysis of translation and its influence on patent law. Proefschrift Maken Maastricht.Lemley, M. A., & Sampat, B. (2012). “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3): 817–827.McMullin, E. (1982). “Values in Science”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2): 3–28.Nagar, V., Schoenfeld, J., & Wellman, L. (2019). “The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67 (1): 36–57.Nelson, R. R. (1989). “What Is Private and What Is Public About Technology?” Science, Technology, & Human Values 14 (3): 229–241.Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). “An Economic Theory of Technological Change”. The American Economic Review 59 (2): 18–28.OECD. (2005). Oslo Manual. OECD-EUROSTAT.OEPM. (2013). Memoria de Actividades. Available at http://www.oepm.gob.es/export/sites/oepm/comun/documentos_relacionados/Memorias_de_Actividades_y_Estadisticas/Memorias_de_actividades/Memoria_de_Actividades_2013_ES.pdfOEPM. (2018). “Entrevista a José Antonio Gil Celedonio, nuevo Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 62: 4–12.OEPM. (2021). “Entrevista al Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 71: 2–10.Ohms, J. (2021). “Current methodologies for chemical compound searching in patents: A case study”. World Patent Information 66: 102055.Righi, C., & Simcoe, T. (2019). “Patent examiner specialization”. Research Policy 48 (1): 137–148.Sáiz, P., & Amengual, R. (2018). “Do patents enable disclosure? Strategic innovation management of the four-stroke engine”. Industrial and Corporate Change 27 (6): 975–997.Schuett, F. (2013). “Patent quality and incentives at the patent office”. The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (2): 313–336.Silvast, A., Laes, E., Abram, S., & Bombaerts, G. (2020). “What do energy modellers know? An ethnography of epistemic values and knowledge models”. Energy Research & Social Science 66: 101495.van Dulken, S. (2014). “Do you know English? The challenge of the English language for patent searchers”. World Patent Information 39: 35–40.Wang, D. (2009). “Chinese to English automatic patent machine translation at SIPO”. World Patent Information 31 (2): 137–139.Whitman, K. (2011). “Intellogist: An online community dedicated to comparing major patent search systems”. World Patent Information 33 (2): 168–179.WIPO. (2021). World Intellectual Property Indicators 2021. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.Ying, C., Shuyu, Y., Jing, L., Lin, D., & Qi, Q. (2021). “Errors of Machine Translation of terminology in the patent text from English into Chinese”. ASP Transactions on Computers 1 (1): 12–17.Benedicto Acosta - 2024info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10062Epistemic values,innovation,social contract,databases,incentivesvalores epistémicos,innovación,contrato social,bases de datos,incentivosvalores epistêmicos,inovação,contrato social,bancos de dados,incentivosValues Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social ContractValues Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social ContractArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2508https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/4af9b7a4-2c5c-4518-867a-4e966e066b26/downloada4ffb2e77ed6010820543b75605b5446MD51001/25371oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/253712025-04-09 12:48:01.913http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0Benedicto Acosta - 2024https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

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