Subastas: diseño y estrategia

Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño...

Full description

Autores:: Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa

Tipo de recurso:: Article of journal

Fecha de publicación:: 2024

Institución:: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Repositorio:: Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia

Idioma:: spa

id	uexternad2_3e3be4acd5ee75b0e7cc8915a5a70721
oai_identifier_str	oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25366
network_acronym_str	uexternad2
network_name_str	Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv	Auctions: Design and Strategy
title	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
spellingShingle	Subastas: diseño y estrategia Auctions, Mechanism Design, Contracts, Specific Relationship Investments, Regulation and Industrial Policy, Switching Costs, Lock-in Subastas, diseño de mecanismos, contratos, Inversiones de relación específica, regulación y política industrial, costos de cambio, Lock-in Leilões, Design de mecanismos, Contratos, Investimentos em relações específicas, Regulação e política industrial, Custos de mudança, Lock-in
title_short	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_full	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_fullStr	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_full_unstemmed	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_sort	Subastas: diseño y estrategia
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv	Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv	Auctions, Mechanism Design, Contracts, Specific Relationship Investments, Regulation and Industrial Policy, Switching Costs, Lock-in
topic	Auctions, Mechanism Design, Contracts, Specific Relationship Investments, Regulation and Industrial Policy, Switching Costs, Lock-in Subastas, diseño de mecanismos, contratos, Inversiones de relación específica, regulación y política industrial, costos de cambio, Lock-in Leilões, Design de mecanismos, Contratos, Investimentos em relações específicas, Regulação e política industrial, Custos de mudança, Lock-in
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv	Subastas, diseño de mecanismos, contratos, Inversiones de relación específica, regulación y política industrial, costos de cambio, Lock-in Leilões, Design de mecanismos, Contratos, Investimentos em relações específicas, Regulação e política industrial, Custos de mudança, Lock-in
description	Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica que identifica los desarrollos recientes y las perspectivas de investigación en el área.
publishDate	2024
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2024-12-04T15:17:53Z 2025-04-09T17:47:57Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2024-12-04T15:17:53Z 2025-04-09T17:47:57Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2024-12-04
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv	Artículo de revista
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversion.spa.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv	Text
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.local.eng.fl_str_mv	Journal article
dc.type.redcol.spa.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF
dc.type.version.spa.fl_str_mv	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
status_str	publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv	10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv	2346-2450
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv	0124-5996
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv	https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25366
dc.identifier.url.none.fl_str_mv	https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07
identifier_str_mv	10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07 2346-2450 0124-5996
url	https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25366 https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv	spa
language	spa
dc.relation.bitstream.none.fl_str_mv	https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10057/17687 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10057/17688
dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv	Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv	216
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv	52
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv	191
dc.relation.citationvolume.spa.fl_str_mv	27
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv	Revista de Economía Institucional
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv	Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. (2007). Recent developments in the theory of regulation. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1557-1700. Āzacis, H., & Burguet, R. (2008). Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo–Dutch auction meets another simple alternative. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(3), 730-745. Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review, 99(4), 1544-1575. Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C. A., Myers, E., Palmer, K., & Shobe, W. (2009). Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(4), 672-691. Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1-40. Chen, J., Chen, X., Kauffman, R. J., & Song, X. (2009). Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 8(4), 191-202. Dass, M., Reddy, S. K., & Iacobucci, D. (2014). Social networks among auction bidders: The role of key bidders and structural properties on auction prices. Social Networks, 37, 14-28. Dequiedt, V. (2007). Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 302-323. Durá, P. (2003). Teoría de subastas y reputación del vendedor (No. CNMV Documentos de Trabajo no. 3. 2003). CNMV-Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores-Departamento de Estudios y Estadísticas. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1983). Competitive bidding and proprietary information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11(2), 161-169. Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1967-2072. Froeb, L. M., Shor, M., & Tschantz, S. (2008). Mergers in auctions with an incumbent advantage. Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper, (08-24). Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2004). Notes and comments the Amsterdam auction. Econometrica, 72(1), 281-294. Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J. J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294. Hazlett, T. W., Porter, D., & Smith, V. (2011). Radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of Ronald Coase. The Journal of Law and Economics, 54(S4), S125-S165. Hu, L., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2014). Spectrum license auctions with exit (and call) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem. Information Economics and Policy, 27, 13-23. Ishii, R. (2009). Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), 137-144. Klemperer, P. (2002a). How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 829-845. Klemperer, P. (2002b). What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189. Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press. Klemperer, P. (2007). Bidding markets. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3(1), 1-47. Lau, S. (2008). Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 266-282. Lewis, T. R., & Yildirim, H. (2005). Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with strategic buyers. International Economic Review, 46(4), 1233-1269. Mintic. (2013). Gobierno adjudica licencias de 4G. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/604/w3-article-2029.html Mölleryd, B. G., & Markendahl, J. (2014). Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices. Telecommunications Policy, 38(3), 236-247. Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58-73. McMillan, J. (1994). Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), 145-162. Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089-1122. Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 245-272. Milgrom, P., & Milgrom, P. R. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press. Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). Oxford University Press. Padhi, S. S., & Mohapatra, P. K. (2011). Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17(4), 207-221. Praxmarer-Carus, S. (2014). Why the proposal of a complex contract may harm or foster a partner’s trust. Journal of Business Research, 67(7), 1421-1429. Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Financing auction bids. RAND Journal of Economics, 789-815. Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(2), 177-195. Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2004). Hold-up and sequential specific investments. RAND Journal of Economics, 386-400. Strieborny, M., & Kukenova, M. (2015). Investment in relationship-specific assets: Does finance matter?. Review of Finance, 20(4), 1487-1515. Subramani, M. R., & Venkatraman, N. (2003). Safeguarding investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships: Theory and evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1), 46-62. Tsang, S., Koh, Y. S., Dobbie, G., & Alam, S. (2014). Detecting online auction shilling frauds using supervised learning. Expert Systems with Applications, 41(6), 3027-3040. Varian, H. R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics (8.ª ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. Vasconcelos, L. (2014). Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 19-33. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press. Zhou, N. (2003). Bidding between incumbent and entrant. Economics Letters, 80(3), 295-303.
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv	Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.uri.spa.fl_str_mv	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
rights_invalid_str_mv	Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024 http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv	openAccess
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv	application/pdf text/html
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv	Universidad Externado de Colombia
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv	https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10057
institution	Universidad Externado de Colombia
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv	https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/c60609ce-dac3-4db3-9c85-af49380e06fe/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv	136300803281807b11cf172aead7d624
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv	MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv	Universidad Externado de Colombia
repository.mail.fl_str_mv	metabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org
_version_	1831928460586516480
spelling	Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa2024-12-04T15:17:53Z2025-04-09T17:47:57Z2024-12-04T15:17:53Z2025-04-09T17:47:57Z2024-12-04Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica que identifica los desarrollos recientes y las perspectivas de investigación en el área.This paper examines elements to consider in auctions beyond the analysis of rational and strategic behavior, and the pursuit of efficiency and better prices for the auctioneer. This work analyzes aspects such as the generation of entry expectations, financing, contract design, and governance mechanisms. For procurement auctions, we analyze auction design elements aimed at attracting entrants, preventing collusion, and avoiding market concentration. It also explores conditions that may lead to ex ante and ex post market power, their impact, possible mechanisms for detection and prevention, and how these are reflected in switching costs. Finally, a bibliographic review was conducted to identify recent developments and research perspectives in this area.application/pdftext/html10.18601/01245996.v27n52.072346-24500124-5996https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25366https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07spaUniversidad Externado de Colombiahttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10057/17687https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10057/17688Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio2165219127Revista de Economía InstitucionalArmstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. (2007). Recent developments in the theory of regulation. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1557-1700.Āzacis, H., & Burguet, R. (2008). Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo–Dutch auction meets another simple alternative. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(3), 730-745.Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review, 99(4), 1544-1575.Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C. A., Myers, E., Palmer, K., & Shobe, W. (2009). Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(4), 672-691.Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1-40.Chen, J., Chen, X., Kauffman, R. J., & Song, X. (2009). Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 8(4), 191-202.Dass, M., Reddy, S. K., & Iacobucci, D. (2014). Social networks among auction bidders: The role of key bidders and structural properties on auction prices. Social Networks, 37, 14-28.Dequiedt, V. (2007). Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 302-323.Durá, P. (2003). Teoría de subastas y reputación del vendedor (No. CNMV Documentos de Trabajo no. 3. 2003). CNMV-Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores-Departamento de Estudios y Estadísticas.Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1983). Competitive bidding and proprietary information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11(2), 161-169.Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1967-2072.Froeb, L. M., Shor, M., & Tschantz, S. (2008). Mergers in auctions with an incumbent advantage. Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper, (08-24).Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2004). Notes and comments the Amsterdam auction. Econometrica, 72(1), 281-294.Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J. J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294.Hazlett, T. W., Porter, D., & Smith, V. (2011). Radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of Ronald Coase. The Journal of Law and Economics, 54(S4), S125-S165.Hu, L., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2014). Spectrum license auctions with exit (and call) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem. Information Economics and Policy, 27, 13-23.Ishii, R. (2009). Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), 137-144.Klemperer, P. (2002a). How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 829-845.Klemperer, P. (2002b). What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press.Klemperer, P. (2007). Bidding markets. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3(1), 1-47.Lau, S. (2008). Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 266-282.Lewis, T. R., & Yildirim, H. (2005). Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with strategic buyers. International Economic Review, 46(4), 1233-1269.Mintic. (2013). Gobierno adjudica licencias de 4G. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/604/w3-article-2029.htmlMölleryd, B. G., & Markendahl, J. (2014). Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices. Telecommunications Policy, 38(3), 236-247.Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58-73.McMillan, J. (1994). Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), 145-162. Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089-1122.Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 245-272.Milgrom, P., & Milgrom, P. R. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press.Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). Oxford University Press.Padhi, S. S., & Mohapatra, P. K. (2011). Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17(4), 207-221.Praxmarer-Carus, S. (2014). Why the proposal of a complex contract may harm or foster a partner’s trust. Journal of Business Research, 67(7), 1421-1429.Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Financing auction bids. RAND Journal of Economics, 789-815.Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(2), 177-195.Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2004). Hold-up and sequential specific investments. RAND Journal of Economics, 386-400.Strieborny, M., & Kukenova, M. (2015). Investment in relationship-specific assets: Does finance matter?. Review of Finance, 20(4), 1487-1515.Subramani, M. R., & Venkatraman, N. (2003). Safeguarding investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships: Theory and evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1), 46-62.Tsang, S., Koh, Y. S., Dobbie, G., & Alam, S. (2014). Detecting online auction shilling frauds using supervised learning. Expert Systems with Applications, 41(6), 3027-3040.Varian, H. R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics (8.ª ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.Vasconcelos, L. (2014). Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 19-33.Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press.Zhou, N. (2003). Bidding between incumbent and entrant. Economics Letters, 80(3), 295-303.Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10057Auctions,Mechanism Design,Contracts,Specific Relationship Investments,Regulation and Industrial Policy,Switching Costs,Lock-inSubastas,diseño de mecanismos,contratos,Inversiones de relación específica,regulación y política industrial,costos de cambio,Lock-inLeilões,Design de mecanismos,Contratos,Investimentos em relações específicas,Regulação e política industrial,Custos de mudança,Lock-inSubastas: diseño y estrategiaAuctions: Design and StrategyArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2451https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/c60609ce-dac3-4db3-9c85-af49380e06fe/download136300803281807b11cf172aead7d624MD51001/25366oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/253662025-04-09 12:47:57.383http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

Subastas: diseño y estrategia

Publicaciones similares