Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico

This paper fills a gap in the literature about Import-substituting Industrialization (ISI) by analyzing non-tariff trade controls, mainly import licenses, with a focus on Mexico, a case that has not been studied in detail. The core questions addressed include: Which specific pattern licensing were f...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Repositorio:
Expeditio: repositorio UTadeo
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co:20.500.12010/21633
Acceso en línea:
https://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/TyE/issue/view/134
https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/21633
Palabra clave:
Rent-Seeking
Import-Licensing In Mexico
Protectionism
Ciencias económicas
Industrialización -- México
Desarrollo económico
Búsqueda De Rentas
Licencias De Importación En México
Proteccionismo
Rights
License
Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Tiempo & Economía
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
title Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
spellingShingle Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
Rent-Seeking
Import-Licensing In Mexico
Protectionism
Ciencias económicas
Industrialización -- México
Desarrollo económico
Búsqueda De Rentas
Licencias De Importación En México
Proteccionismo
title_short Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
title_full Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
title_fullStr Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
title_full_unstemmed Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
title_sort Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Rent-Seeking
Import-Licensing In Mexico
Protectionism
topic Rent-Seeking
Import-Licensing In Mexico
Protectionism
Ciencias económicas
Industrialización -- México
Desarrollo económico
Búsqueda De Rentas
Licencias De Importación En México
Proteccionismo
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv Ciencias económicas
Industrialización -- México
Desarrollo económico
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Búsqueda De Rentas
Licencias De Importación En México
Proteccionismo
description This paper fills a gap in the literature about Import-substituting Industrialization (ISI) by analyzing non-tariff trade controls, mainly import licenses, with a focus on Mexico, a case that has not been studied in detail. The core questions addressed include: Which specific pattern licensing were followed? What was the economic rationale behind such pattern, and Is there evidence that non-tariff controls were ‘captured’ that is, facilitating rent-seeking? In order to answer these questions, the project takes a qualitative and quantitative approach, using primary evidence gathered in archives as well as statistics from secondary sources, which are combined in novel ways. Specifically, here we provide descriptive statistics of the licensing system, and demonstrate that the policy lacked internal consistency, an overwhelming majority of products were protected for far longer than officially specified, and that illegal source of rents from trade –smuggling and “free perimeters”– were significant. The main findings, which shed light on larger debates about ISI are that excessive protectionism was neither effective nor sustainable and that cronyism characterized the post-Second World War process of industrialization in Mexico.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-29
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-07T19:09:41Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-07T19:09:41Z
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dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv Castañeda, A. (2020). Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico. Tiempo Y economía, 7(2), 90-118. https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615
dc.identifier.other.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/TyE/issue/view/134
https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/21633
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.21789/24222704.1615
identifier_str_mv Castañeda, A. (2020). Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico. Tiempo Y economía, 7(2), 90-118. https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615
10.21789/24222704.1615
url https://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/TyE/issue/view/134
https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/21633
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Tiempo & Economía
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Tiempo & Economía
Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 29 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Expeditio Repositorio Institucional UJTL
institution Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
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spelling 2021-09-07T19:09:41Z2021-09-07T19:09:41Z2020-05-29Castañeda, A. (2020). Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico. Tiempo Y economía, 7(2), 90-118. https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615https://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/TyE/issue/view/134https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1615http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/2163310.21789/24222704.1615This paper fills a gap in the literature about Import-substituting Industrialization (ISI) by analyzing non-tariff trade controls, mainly import licenses, with a focus on Mexico, a case that has not been studied in detail. The core questions addressed include: Which specific pattern licensing were followed? What was the economic rationale behind such pattern, and Is there evidence that non-tariff controls were ‘captured’ that is, facilitating rent-seeking? In order to answer these questions, the project takes a qualitative and quantitative approach, using primary evidence gathered in archives as well as statistics from secondary sources, which are combined in novel ways. Specifically, here we provide descriptive statistics of the licensing system, and demonstrate that the policy lacked internal consistency, an overwhelming majority of products were protected for far longer than officially specified, and that illegal source of rents from trade –smuggling and “free perimeters”– were significant. The main findings, which shed light on larger debates about ISI are that excessive protectionism was neither effective nor sustainable and that cronyism characterized the post-Second World War process of industrialization in Mexico.#Rent-SeekingEste artículo pretende llenar un vacío en la literatura sobre la industri-alización sustitutiva de importaciones (ISI) mediante el análisis de controles comerciales no arancelarios (principalmente licencias de importación) en México, un país en el que este asunto no ha sido estudiado en detalle. Las preguntas centrales abordadas son: ¿qué patrón de licenciamiento específ-ico siguió este país; ¿cuál fue la razón económica detrás de dicho patrón?; ¿existe evidencia de que los controles no arancelarios fueron “capturados” para facilitar la búsqueda de rentas? Para responder estas preguntas, el proyecto adopta un enfoque cualitativo y cuantitativo, utilizando eviden-cia primaria obtenida de archivos y estadísticas de fuentes secundarias, las cuales se combinan de formas novedosas. Específicamente, este trabajo proporciona estadísticas descriptivas del sistema de licencias para dem-ostrar que la política carecía de consistencia interna, la protección otorgada a la abrumadora mayoría de los productos durante mucho más tiempo de lo que se especificó oficialmente y que la fuente ilegal de rentas del comercio, es decir, el contrabando y los “perímetros libres”, tuvo un valor significativo. Los principales hallazgos, que arrojan luz sobre debates más amplios sobre la ISI, señalan que el proteccionismo excesivo no fue efectivo ni sostenible y que el clientelismo caracterizó el proceso de industrialización posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial en México.29 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo LozanoCopyright (c) 2022 Revista Tiempo & EconomíaAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Expeditio Repositorio Institucional UJTLRent-SeekingImport-Licensing In MexicoProtectionismCiencias económicasIndustrialización -- MéxicoDesarrollo económicoBúsqueda De RentasLicencias De Importación En MéxicoProteccionismoCronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexicoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Castañeda, AlejandroORIGINALdocument.pdfdocument.pdfVer documentoapplication/pdf192253https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/21633/5/document.pdf2019242c8d543e4d9ab04044483072daMD55open accessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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