Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students
Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2
- Autores:
-
Harker Roa, Arturo
Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2023
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/66329
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/66329
- Palabra clave:
- Education
Political agency
Corruption
Clientelism
Economía
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdf
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
| title |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism Economía |
| title_short |
Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students |
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Harker Roa, Arturo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Harker Roa, Arturo Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Yamin Silva, Juan Camilo |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism |
| topic |
Education Political agency Corruption Clientelism Economía |
| dc.subject.themes.es_CO.fl_str_mv |
Economía |
| description |
Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2 |
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2023 |
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2023-04-24T21:22:30Z |
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2023-04 |
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10.57784/1992/66329 |
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eng |
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Documentos CEDE;2023-10 |
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69 páginas |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Facultad de Economía |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Harker Roa, Arturo8662600Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés6a99d083-0c3c-4d79-94b2-13119f25b02c600Fergusson Talero, Leopoldovirtual::17843-1Yamin Silva, Juan Camilovirtual::17844-12023-04-24T21:22:30Z2023-04-24T21:22:30Z2023-041657-7191http://hdl.handle.net/1992/6632910.57784/1992/66329Códigos JEL.: D7, H5, H7, I2We examine how political connections (measured as partisan alignment) influence corruption in clientelistic environments, focusing on the fabrication of "ghost" students to inflate education transfers to local governments in Colombia. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that partisan alignment between mayors and governors increases ghost student by 0.3 standard deviations, without improving genuine enrollment or student performance. Political connections also lead to more discretionary hiring, patronage-based outsourcing, and increased electoral fraud risk. The effects are strongest in municipalities with weaker institutions and entrenched clientelism. These findings support a privately-driven model of corruption, where resource diversion benefits politicians with few benefits for local constituencies. Connected politicians also experience better future electoral prospects, suggesting a breakdown in accountability. Our results highlight how clientelistic networks distort public service delivery, reinforcing the persistence of political corruption.Estudiamos el efecto de los vínculos entre políticos sobre la corrupción bajo clientelismo imperante. Las conexiones entre políticos aumentan los estudiantes "fantasmas" fabricados para obtener más transferencias nacionales, sin elevar la calidad ni la cantidad de la educación. También aumentan la rotación burocrática, las contrataciones temporales y discrecionales, el fraude electoral y las denuncias contra funcionarios. Los efectos sobre los fantasmas son mayores en los municipios con más clientelismo, discreción sobre el gasto de recursos y una supervisión más débil. Los hallazgos favorecen una visión venal de la corrupción, donde los políticos desvían recursos para beneficio personal en lugar de favorecer a sus electores. No obstante, tienen mejores perspectivas futuras de carrera, lo que refleja una falla en el control electoral.69 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los AndesFacultad de EconomíaDocumentos CEDE;2023-10https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/020732.htmlhttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost studentsDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPEducationPolitical agencyCorruptionClientelismEconomíaPublication3ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::17843-1b3efd563-540e-4577-a581-30025ba85386virtual::17844-13ca859b2-d3ce-4f17-975a-9a5a01525871virtual::17843-1b3efd563-540e-4577-a581-30025ba85386virtual::17844-1https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=Vh0eC9QAAAAJvirtual::17843-10000-0002-8012-2301virtual::17843-1https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000176842virtual::17843-1THUMBNAILdcede2023-10.pdf.jpgdcede2023-10.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg18466https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/a7b678ec-8d50-4a8d-bca1-947a43cb6dbd/downloadfd764134310ba33b59ac4c56bceea61cMD54LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81810https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/26b57013-aa59-4476-b6e9-03f9880ee14e/download5aa5c691a1ffe97abd12c2966efcb8d6MD51TEXTdcede2023-10.pdf.txtdcede2023-10.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain153824https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/1dedb289-cfda-439c-83a6-afb75bf5d58f/downloadb76d39d911542a6c982382d8bb53c823MD53ORIGINALdcede2023-10.pdfapplication/pdf11153826https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/fa163c1d-2c0c-481a-b21f-f07c4fd5a0e9/download241bcd667531e9d5aeb7df4eabf0aba0MD551992/66329oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/663292025-03-07 08:08:43.69https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/static/pdf/aceptacion_uso_es.pdfopen.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.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 |