Three empirical essays on marine economics and illegal fishing

Marine resource conservation has been one of the foremost challenges for governments and international organizations. The vastness of the oceans, the involvement of multiple stakeholders, and the lack of available data have made effective management difficult. However, in recent years, the increasin...

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Autores:
Montero Mestre, Jorge Luis
Tipo de recurso:
Doctoral thesis
Fecha de publicación:
2024
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/75776
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/1992/75776
Palabra clave:
Conservation
Illegal Fishing
Natural Resource Governance
Marine Protected Areas
COVID-19
Compliance
Economía
Rights
openAccess
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Description
Summary:Marine resource conservation has been one of the foremost challenges for governments and international organizations. The vastness of the oceans, the involvement of multiple stakeholders, and the lack of available data have made effective management difficult. However, in recent years, the increasing availability of high-resolution data has enhanced our understanding of oceanic activities and the role of conservation instruments in preserving these critical resources. In this dissertation, I employ high-resolution data combined with causal inference econometrics to analyze the behaviors and responses of industrial fishers, aiming to strengthen the knowledge base that supports marine conservation and governance instruments. Across three chapters, I explore how vessels operate around the most widely used marine conservation instruments and how they behave when unobserved; how fishers react to changes in enforcement levels; and how incentives, such as fuel subsidies, can create distortions that exacerbate maritime governance tensions between countries. These insights are crucial for informing policy and improving the sustainable management of marine ecosystems. In the chapter 1, I study Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which are an essential instrument for marine conservation, aimed at promoting the sustainable use of marine resources. In this study, I examine the dynamics and behavior of industrial fishing vessels in relation to MPAs, leveraging extensive global fishing data. I assess vessel compliance by evaluating their presence within MPAs, using both Automatic Identification System (AIS) data and satellite imagery. The main findings indicate that MPAs significantly reduce industrial fishing activity within their boundaries, with a more pronounced reduction observed in MPAs with higher levels of fishing protection. These findings hold true when using both satellite imagery and AIS data. Differences arise when focusing on the Caribbean. In terms of biological conditions for fishing, those MPAs with more favorable fishing conditions tend to experience lower activity compared to other regions, highlighting their effectiveness in preserving these ecosystems. Additionally, evidence suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic led to significant increases in detected activity within MPAs. This research provides valuable insights for strengthening marine conservation efforts and enhancing MPA management by offering a deeper understanding of industrial fishing vessel behavior. In chapter 2, I examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on property rights in the context of unauthorized fishing activity providing theoretical and empirical evidences. The global health crisis disrupted economic activities and posed significant challenges to fisheries management, control, and surveillance. This study investigates to what extent the pandemic led to an increase in unauthorized fishing, potentially undermining existing property rights systems. To do so, I compile a comprehensive database with weekly, country-level fishing effort data for 146 countries before and during the COVID-19 lockdowns and international fishing access agreements data. I employ Differences in Differences approaches to shed light on the consequences of the pandemic for marine resource governance. The findings indicate that the stringency of the restrictions led to a decrease in authorized fishing efforts. However, unauthorized fishing hours increased, but I did not find any effects on the number of vessels engaged in unauthorized fishing due to the onset of the lockdowns. The increase in unauthorized fishing hours was higher in low- and middle-income countries, and in areas with a higher biodiversity index. These results inform the design of control policies by understanding the motivations of fishermen in low-monitoring scenarios. Finally, in chapter 3, using a newly released dataset, I examine the impact of the fuel subsidies provision on fishing activity and unauthorized fishing following a fuel subsidy program reform introduced in 2016 by the Chinese government. In recent years, there has been significant discussion regarding the impacts of input subsidies on the sustainability of marine ecosystems, particularly in terms of promoting overexploitation through the marginal reduction of costs; moreover, Illegal, Unauthorized, and Unreported (IUU) fishing has significant implications for the sustainability of many fisheries worldwide. The Chinese government has been known for providing a wide variety of subsidies within its economy to bolster its economic position relative to other world economies. In 2016, China introduced a reform to its fuel subsidy program for fishing fleets due to high levels of subsidy expenditure, fuel consumption, and overfishing. By leveraging the discontinuities introduced by the reform, I find that after the reform, the hours of unauthorized fishing increased, particularly in Taiwan and in disputed areas. Vessels that receive a greater amount of subsidies reduce their activity within national waters and increase their operations in foreign waters, potentially leading to overexploitation of fish stocks in international waters and conflicts with neighboring countries over disputed fishing grounds. The results suggest that subsidies decrease the level of compliance among fishermen and encourage IUU fishing.