Homo aequalis : a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining games

Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and ThirdParty Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.

• Autores: Wallace, Chris; Ensminger, Jean; Henrich, Joseph; Barrett, Clark; Bolyanatz, Alexander; Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Gurven, Michael; Gwako, Edwins; Lesorogol, Carolyn; Marlowe, Frank; McElreath, Richard; Tracer, David; Ziker, John; Barr, Abigail
• Tipo de recurso: Work document
• Fecha de publicación: 2009
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8104
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8104
• Palabra clave: Bargaining games; Cross-cultural experiments; Inequality aversion; Redes sociales - Aspectos económicos; Grupos sociales - Aspectos económicos; Teoría de los juegos; C72, C9, Z13
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/