Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental

El constructo de soborno que emplean los estudios experimentales sobre corrupción enfrenta tres desafíos interrelacionados. En primer lugar, la noción de confianza em-pleada en el constructo de soborno reduce la misma a un mero cálculo de riesgo. En se-gundo lugar, y como consecuencia de lo anterior...

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Autores:: Senci, Carlos Maximiliano

Tipo de recurso:: https://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501

Fecha de publicación:: 2021

Institución:: Universidad El Bosque

Repositorio:: Repositorio U. El Bosque

Idioma:: eng

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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
dc.title.translated.spa.fl_str_mv	Challenging the Construct Validity of Bribery in Experimental Economics
title	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
spellingShingle	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental Soborno Validez de constructo Experimentos de laboratorio Confianza Normas Bribery Construct validity Lab experiments Trust Norms
title_short	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
title_full	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
title_fullStr	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
title_full_unstemmed	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
title_sort	Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Senci, Carlos Maximiliano
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv	Senci, Carlos Maximiliano
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv	0000-0001-9131-3843
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv	Soborno Validez de constructo Experimentos de laboratorio Confianza Normas
topic	Soborno Validez de constructo Experimentos de laboratorio Confianza Normas Bribery Construct validity Lab experiments Trust Norms
dc.subject.keywords.spa.fl_str_mv	Bribery Construct validity Lab experiments Trust Norms
description	El constructo de soborno que emplean los estudios experimentales sobre corrupción enfrenta tres desafíos interrelacionados. En primer lugar, la noción de confianza em-pleada en el constructo de soborno reduce la misma a un mero cálculo de riesgo. En se-gundo lugar, y como consecuencia de lo anterior, el contexto apropiado de interacción se encuentra indeterminado. Por último, los experimentos presentan una insuficiente explicitación del marco normativo. En resumen, los investigadores sobre corrupción deben ser conscientes de los desafíos del constructo que emplean en el laboratorio y deben abordar los problemas antes mencionados para no comprometer la validez de sus resultados.
publishDate	2021
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2021-11-03T16:22:22Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2021-11-03T16:22:22Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2021-01-01
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dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv	Artículo de revista
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv	https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v21i42.3252
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv	instname:Universidad El Bosque
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url	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6305 https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v21i42.3252
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv	eng
language	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.spa.fl_str_mv	Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 21 Núm 42, 2021, 205-234.
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Experimental Economics 12.1 (2009): 113-132. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9207-3> Alekseev, Aleksandr., Gary Charness., and Uri Gneezy. “Experimental Methods: When and Why Contextual Instructions Are Important”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134.1 (2017): 48-59. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.005> Alexandrova, Ana., and Daniel M, Heibron. “Is Construct Validation Valid?” Philos-ophy of Science 83.5 (2016): 1098-1109. <https://doi.org/10.1086/687941> Andvig, Jens Chr. “Corruption and Fast Change”. World Development 34.2 (2006): 328-340. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.007> Armantier, Oliver., and Amadou, Boly. “A Controlled Field Experiment on Cor-ruption”. European Economic Review, 55.8 (2011): 1072–1082. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007> Banerjee, Ritwik. “On the Interpretation of Bribery in a Laboratory Corruption Game: Moral Frames and Social Norms”. Experimental Economics 19.1 (2016): 240–267. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1> Banfield, Edward C. “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society”. Glencoe: IL: The Free Press, 1958. Barr, Abigail., and Danila, Serra. “The Effects of Externalities and Framing on Brib-ery in a Petty Corruption Experiment”. Experimental Economics 12.4 (2009): 488-503. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9> Barron, Kenneth., Allison R. Brown., Christopher R. Gesualdi., Kimberly A. Marchuk., and Theresa E. Egan. “Validity”. 21st Century Psychology: A Reference Handbook. Eds. Davis, Stephen F., and Buskist, William. Thousand Oaks, Cal-ifornia: Sage, 2008. 55–64. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412956321.n7> Berg, Joyce., Dickhaut, John., and McCabe, Kevin. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History”. Games and Economic Behavior 10.1 (1995): 122-142. <https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027> Bicchieri, Cristina. “The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Borsboom, Denny. “Measuring the Mind”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511490026> Borsboom, Denny., Cramer, Angélique., Kievit, Rogier A., Franić, Sanja., and Scholten, Annemarie Zand. “The End of Construct Validity”. The Concept of Validity: Revisions, New Directions, and Applications. Ed. Lissitz, Robert W. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2009. 135-170. Bray, John. “The Use of Intermediaries and Other ‘Alternatives’ to Bribery”. The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. Eds. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube and Matthias Schramm. London: Routledge, 2004. 112-137. Brennan, Geoffrey., Lina Eriksson, Brennan., Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. “Explaining Norms”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Bobkova, Nina., y Egbert, Henrik. “Corruption investigated in the lab: A Survey of the Experimental Literature”. International Journal of Latest Trends in Finance and Economic Sciences 2.4 (2012): 337-349. <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38163> Camaño-Alegre, María. and Camaño-Alegre, José. “From Ontological Traits to Va-lidity Challenges in Social Science: The Cases of Economic Experiments and Research Questionnaires”. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32.2 (2019): 101-127. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773> Campbell, Donald T. “Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in So-cial Settings”. Psychological Bulletin 54.4 (1957): 297–312. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040950> Campbell Donald T., and Cook Thomas D. “Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings”. Dallas, Ill.: Houghton Mifflin, 1979. Capraro, Valerio. and Rand, David G. “Do the Right Thing: Experimental Evidence that Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather than Equity and Efficiency Per Se, Drive Human Prosociality”. Judgment and Decision Making 13.1 (2018): 99-111. Cialdini, R.B., Reno, R.R., and Kallgren C.A. “A Focus Theory of Normative con-duct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58.6 (1990): 1015–1026. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015> Coleman, James William. “Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime”. American Journal of Sociology 93.2 (1987): 406-439. <https://doi.org/10.1086/228750> Cronbach, Lee J., and Meehl, Paul E. “Construct Validity in Psychological Tests”. Psychological Bulletin 52.4 (1955): 281-302. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040957> Della Porta, Donnatella., and Vannuci, Alberto. “Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Re-sources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption”. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1999. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315080284> Engel, Christoph., and Rand, David G. “What does ‘Clean’ Really Mean? the Im-plicit Framing of Decontextualized Experiments”. Economic Letters 122.3 (2014): 386-389. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.020> Falk, Armin., and Czech, Nora. “Morals and Markets”. Science 340.6133 (2013): 707-711. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1231566> Fehr, Ernst., and Schmidt, Klaus M. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Coop-eration”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114.3 (1999): 817–868. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151> Frank, Björn. and Schulze, Günther G. “Does Economics make Citizens Corrupt?”.Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43.1 (2000): 101-113. <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00111-6> Gneezy, Uri., and Rustichini, Aldo. “A Fine Is a Price”. The Journal of Legal Studies 29.1 (2000): 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1086/468061> Guala, Francesco. “The Methodology of Experimental Economics”. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511614651> Hansson, Sven O. “Risk”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. 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Rationality and Society 31.3 (2019): 287-312. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119853893> Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook., and Donald T., Campbell. “Experimental and Quasi experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference”. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. Smith, Vernon. “Papers in Experimental Economics”. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1991. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511528354> Sjöberg, Lennart. “The Methodology of Risk Perception Research”. Quality & Quantity 34 (2000): 407-418. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004838806793> Suppe, Frederick. “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theo-ries”. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Ed. Frederick Suppe. Urbana: Uni-versity of Illinois Press, 1974. 1-241. Thaler, Richard H. “Mental Accounting Matters”. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12.3 (1999): 183-206. Uslaner, Eric M. “Trust and Corruption”. Corruption and the New Institutional Eco-nomics. Eds. J. G. Lambsdorf, M. Taube, and M. Schramm. London: Rout-ledge, 2004. 76-92. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203413920> Xiao, Erte. “Punishment, Social Norms and Cooperation”. Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics. Eds. Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler. Elgar Publishing, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805681.00014> Warren, M. “Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion”. Political Science & Pol-itics 39.4 (2006): 803-807. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096506060975> Williamson, Oliver E. “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization”. The Journal of Law & Economics 36.1 (1993): 453-486. <https://doi.org/10.1086/467284>
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spelling	Senci, Carlos Maximiliano0000-0001-9131-38432021-11-03T16:22:22Z2021-11-03T16:22:22Z2021-01-010124-4620https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6305https://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v21i42.3252instname:Universidad El Bosquereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquerepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.coEl constructo de soborno que emplean los estudios experimentales sobre corrupción enfrenta tres desafíos interrelacionados. En primer lugar, la noción de confianza em-pleada en el constructo de soborno reduce la misma a un mero cálculo de riesgo. En se-gundo lugar, y como consecuencia de lo anterior, el contexto apropiado de interacción se encuentra indeterminado. Por último, los experimentos presentan una insuficiente explicitación del marco normativo. En resumen, los investigadores sobre corrupción deben ser conscientes de los desafíos del constructo que emplean en el laboratorio y deben abordar los problemas antes mencionados para no comprometer la validez de sus resultados.The bribery construct employed by experimental studies of corruption faces three inter-related challenges. First, the notion of trust used in the bribery construct reduces it to a mere calculation of risk. Second, and as a consequence of the above, the appropriate context of interaction is undetermined. Finally, the experiments show an insufficient clarification of the normative framework. In short, researchers on corruption should be mindful of the challenges of the construct they employ in the lab, and they should tackle the aforementioned issues in order not to compromise the validity of their results.application/pdfengRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 21 Núm 42, 2021, 205-234.https://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/3252Abbink, Klaus. “Staff Rotation as an Anti-corruption Policy: an Experimental Study”. Journal of European Political Economy 20.4 (2004): 887-906. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008>Abbink, Klaus., and Hennig-Schmidt, Heike. “Neutral Versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment”. Experimental Economics 9.2 (2006): 103-121. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z>Abbink, Klaus., and Serra, Danila. “Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab”. New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption (Research in Exper-imental Economics, Vol. 15. Eds. Serra, Danila. and Wantchekon, Leonard. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012. 77-115. <https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-2306(2012)0000015006>Alatas, Vivi., Cameron, Lisa., Erkal, Nisvan., and Gangadharan, Lata. “Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A comparison of Indonesian Public Ser-vants and Indonesian Students”. Experimental Economics 12.1 (2009): 113-132. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9207-3>Alekseev, Aleksandr., Gary Charness., and Uri Gneezy. “Experimental Methods: When and Why Contextual Instructions Are Important”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134.1 (2017): 48-59. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.005>Alexandrova, Ana., and Daniel M, Heibron. “Is Construct Validation Valid?” Philos-ophy of Science 83.5 (2016): 1098-1109. <https://doi.org/10.1086/687941>Andvig, Jens Chr. “Corruption and Fast Change”. World Development 34.2 (2006): 328-340. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.007>Armantier, Oliver., and Amadou, Boly. “A Controlled Field Experiment on Cor-ruption”. European Economic Review, 55.8 (2011): 1072–1082. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007>Banerjee, Ritwik. “On the Interpretation of Bribery in a Laboratory Corruption Game: Moral Frames and Social Norms”. Experimental Economics 19.1 (2016): 240–267. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1>Banfield, Edward C. “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society”. Glencoe: IL: The Free Press, 1958.Barr, Abigail., and Danila, Serra. “The Effects of Externalities and Framing on Brib-ery in a Petty Corruption Experiment”. Experimental Economics 12.4 (2009): 488-503. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9>Barron, Kenneth., Allison R. Brown., Christopher R. Gesualdi., Kimberly A. Marchuk., and Theresa E. Egan. “Validity”. 21st Century Psychology: A Reference Handbook. Eds. Davis, Stephen F., and Buskist, William. Thousand Oaks, Cal-ifornia: Sage, 2008. 55–64. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412956321.n7>Berg, Joyce., Dickhaut, John., and McCabe, Kevin. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History”. Games and Economic Behavior 10.1 (1995): 122-142. <https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027>Bicchieri, Cristina. “The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Borsboom, Denny. “Measuring the Mind”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511490026>Borsboom, Denny., Cramer, Angélique., Kievit, Rogier A., Franić, Sanja., and Scholten, Annemarie Zand. “The End of Construct Validity”. The Concept of Validity: Revisions, New Directions, and Applications. Ed. Lissitz, Robert W. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2009. 135-170.Bray, John. “The Use of Intermediaries and Other ‘Alternatives’ to Bribery”. The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. Eds. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube and Matthias Schramm. London: Routledge, 2004. 112-137.Brennan, Geoffrey., Lina Eriksson, Brennan., Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. “Explaining Norms”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.Bobkova, Nina., y Egbert, Henrik. “Corruption investigated in the lab: A Survey of the Experimental Literature”. International Journal of Latest Trends in Finance and Economic Sciences 2.4 (2012): 337-349. <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38163>Camaño-Alegre, María. and Camaño-Alegre, José. “From Ontological Traits to Va-lidity Challenges in Social Science: The Cases of Economic Experiments and Research Questionnaires”. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32.2 (2019): 101-127. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1682773>Campbell, Donald T. “Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in So-cial Settings”. 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Desafiando la validez de constructo de soborno en la economía experimental

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