Cooperative game study of airlines based on flight price optimization in times of COVID-19

 International and domestic travel increase the likelihood of the speed of the spread of infectious diseases. Little information is available on the operation of major airports and local government regulations on the transmission of respiratory infections. We investigated the frequency of air travel given the presence of 2019-nCoV in the passenger environment on the London-New York route to identify which scenario is of maximum benefit in the four-airline alliance. A  theoretical model was made and then several scenarios were simulated to determine the optimal parameters of the cooperative game (airline alliance).  An alliance for British Airways is convenient under the scenario proposed, increasing the ticket price to its historical maximum, sharing demand equally with the other airlines, and maintaining fixed flight costs. In addition, cooperation with the other airlines  will allow British to decrease its frequency of travel but earn higher total profit. It was also shown that deviating from the coalition is a feasible scenario under the assumption. Finally,  it was found that the variables price, flight costs, and demand discount rate are important  when deciding to collude with the competition. 

• Autores: palomino, kevin rafael; Berdugo Correa, Carmen
• Tipo de recurso: Article of journal
• Fecha de publicación: 2025
• Institución: Universidad de San Buenaventura
• Repositorio: Repositorio USB
• Idioma: spa
• OAI Identifier: oai:bibliotecadigital.usb.edu.co:10819/29036
• Acceso en línea: https://hdl.handle.net/10819/29036; https://doi.org/10.21500/20275846.6377
• Palabra clave: Airports, 2019-nCoV, spatial analysis, cooperative games, game theory, optimization.; Airports, 2019-nCoV, spatial analysis, cooperative games, game theory, optimization.
• Rights: openAccess
• License: Ingenierías USBMed - 2025