Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad

En este trabajo nos proponemos dos objetivos: primero, exponer cómo la novedad, como requisito para la obtención de una patente, obstaculiza la realización de una ciencia abierta en términos de comunicación y uso; segundo, determinar los incentivos que llevan a la industria a optar por una ciencia a...

Full description

Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad de Caldas
Repositorio:
Repositorio Institucional U. Caldas
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/15867
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15867
Palabra clave:
scientific research
patent
novelty
secrecy
open science
investigación científica
patente
novedad
secretismo
ciencia abierta
Rights
openAccess
License
Derechos de autor 2018 Jurídicas
id REPOUCALDA_59d1cd06341603f6b30cc6d5ba7f7e41
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/15867
network_acronym_str REPOUCALDA
network_name_str Repositorio Institucional U. Caldas
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
On the in-compatibility of open science with novelty as a standard of patentability
title Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
spellingShingle Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
scientific research
patent
novelty
secrecy
open science
investigación científica
patente
novedad
secretismo
ciencia abierta
title_short Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
title_full Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
title_fullStr Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
title_full_unstemmed Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
title_sort Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidad
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv scientific research
patent
novelty
secrecy
open science
investigación científica
patente
novedad
secretismo
ciencia abierta
topic scientific research
patent
novelty
secrecy
open science
investigación científica
patente
novedad
secretismo
ciencia abierta
description En este trabajo nos proponemos dos objetivos: primero, exponer cómo la novedad, como requisito para la obtención de una patente, obstaculiza la realización de una ciencia abierta en términos de comunicación y uso; segundo, determinar los incentivos que llevan a la industria a optar por una ciencia abierta en los términos propuestos, dejando de lado el patentamiento. Para lograrlos, primero presentaremos los argumentos jurídicoeconómicos que llevan a considerar la patente como incentivo del desarrollo tecnocientífico, pero cómo el “efecto red” es coartado por la misma. Segundo, analizaremos el período de gracia como excepción que impide que la divulgación de la invención, previa a la solicitud de una patente, no destruya la novedad. Finalmente, estudiaremos cómo la industria acoge y alienta al software libre, caso paradigmático de la ciencia abierta, al identificar que el “efecto red” genera una utilidad superior a la de otras estrategias de producción científica.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-07-01 00:00:00
2018-07-01 00:00:00
2018-07-01
2021-02-07T10:10:25Z
2021-02-07T10:10:25Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
Sección Artículos
Journal Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Text
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv 1794-2918
https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15867
10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
2590-8928
identifier_str_mv 1794-2918
10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
2590-8928
url https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6
https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15867
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 103
2
88
15
Jurídicas
Acosta, R. (2009). Open Source Hardware. (Doctoral Dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Massachusetts.
AIPPI . (2013). Informe de Síntesis de la Cuestión 233, Periodo de Gracia para Patentes. Recuperado de https://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/233/SR233Spanish.pdf.
Arrow, K. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton University Press.
de Beer, J. & Jain, V. (2018). Inclusive Innovation in Biohacker Spaces: The Role of Systems and Networks. Technology Innovation Management Review, 8 (2), 27.
Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E.G., Anderson, M.S., Causino, N. & Louis, K.S. (1997). Withholding research results in academic life science: evidence from a national survey of faculty. Jama, 277 (15), 1224-1228.
Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E.G., Gokhale, M., Yucel, R., Clarridge, B., Hilgartner, S. & Holtzman, N.A. (2006). Data withholding in genetics and the other life sciences: prevalences and predictors. Academic Medicine, 81 (2), 137-145.
Boldrin, M. & Levine, D.K. (2008). Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge University Press. Botana Agra, M. (2013). Invenciones Patentables. En C. Fernández Novoa., J. M. Otero Lastres y M.
Botana Agra (Eds.), Manual de la Propiedad Industrial (pp. 113-143). Madrid, España: Marcial Pons.
Campbell, E.G., Clarridge, B.R., Gokhale, M., Birenbaum, L., Hilgartner, S., Holtzman, N.A. & Blumenthal, D. (2002). Data withholding in academic genetics: evidence from a national survey. Jama, 287(4), 473-480.
Comisión Europea. (2016). Open Innovation, open science, open to the world: a vision for Europe. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation.
Di Cola, P. (2013). Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives. Arizona Law Review, 55 (2), 301-370.
Drahos, P. (2010). The global governance of knowledge: patent offices and their clients. UK: Cambridge University Press.
European Patent Office (EPO). (2015). Introducing a grace period in Europe? EPO. Economic and Scientific Advisory Board.
Fecher, B. & Friesike, S. (2014). Open science: One term, five schools of thought. In Opening science (pp. 17-47). Springer, Cham.
Fei, X. & Wang, J. (2016). Life Science Innovation in China. National Bureau of Asian Research, 56, 1-22.
Feldman, R. (2009). Plain Language Patents. Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 17, 289-304.
Franzoni, C. & Scellato, G. (2010). The grace period in international patent law and its effect on the timing of disclosure. Research Policy, 39, 200-213.
Gans, J.S., Murray, F.E. & Stern, S. (2013). Contracting over the disclosure of scientific knowledge: Intellectual property and academic publication (No. w19560). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Graham, S. & Hegde, D. (2015). Disclosing patents’ secrets. Science, 347(6219), 236-237.
Grimmelmann, J. (2010). The Internet is a semicommons. Fordham Law Review, 78(6), 2799-2842.
Gupta, G., Nowatzki, T, Gangadhar, V. & Sankaralingam, K. (2017). Kickstarting Semmiconductor Innovation with Open Source Hardware. IEEE Computer Society, 50(6), 50-59.
Joachim, J. (2015). Is the AIA the End of Grace: Examining the Effect of the America Invents Act on the Patent Grace Period. New York University Law Review, 90, 1293-1330.
Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C. (1985). Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The American Economic Review, 75(3)
Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C. (1994). Systems Competition and Network Effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2).
Kim, T. & Shin, D. (2016). Social platform innovation of open source hardware in South Korea. Telematics and Informatics, 33, 217-226.
Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (2004). The political economy of intellectual property law. American Enterprise Institute.
Lemley, M.A. (2012). The myth of the sole inventor. Michigan Law Review, 709-760.
Leydesdorff, L. & Meyer, M. (2010). The decline of university patenting and the end of the Bayh—Dole effect. Scientometrics, 83(2), 355-362.
Liu, G. (2013). Visualization of patents and papers in terahertz technology: a comparative study. Scientometrics, 94 (3), 1037-1056.
Lock, J. (2013). Open Source Hardware. Can embedded electronics companies thrive through the use and/or development of open source hardware? Master’s Thesis Dissertation, Chalmers University of Technology.
Merges, R.P. (2012). Priority and Novelty under the AIA. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 27(2), 1023-1046.
Merton, R.K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. University of Chicago Press.
Nagaoka, S. & Nishimura, Y. (2015). Use of Grace Periods and Their Impact on Knowledge Flow: Evidence from Japan. RIETI Discussion Pape Series, 15-E-072.
Pearce, J.M. (2016). Return on investment for open source scientific hardware development. Science and Public Policy, 43(2), 192-195.
Pénin, J. (2009). On the consequences of university patenting: What can we learn by asking directly to academic inventors? (No. 2009-04). Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
Ramos Toledano, J. (2017b). Vivir del arte. mientrastanto.org. Recuperado de http://www.mientrastanto. org/boletin-155/notas/vivir-del-arte.
Stallman, R. (2004). Software libre para una sociedad libre. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños. Stiglitz, J. (1999). Knowledge as a Global Public Good. En Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. & Stern, Marc A. (Ed.) Global Public Goods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stiglitz, J. (2008). Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights. Duke Law Journal, 57, 1693-1724.
Sun, Y. (2003). Determinants of foreign patents in China. World Patent Information, 25(1), 27-37.
Tegernsee Group, DKPTO, BMJV/DPMA, EPO, INPI, JPO, UK IPO, USPTO (2014). Consolidated Report on the Tegernsee User Consultation on Substantive Patent Law armonization.
Tessensohn, J. & Yamamoto, S. (2007). Japan’s novelty grace period solves the dilemma of ‘publish and perish’. Nature Biotechnology, 25(1), 55-57.
The Linux Foundation (2016). Linux Kernel Development. How Fast It is Going, Who is Doing It, What They Are Doing and Who is Sponsoring the Work.
Walsh, J.P. & Huang, H. (2014). Local context, academic entrepreneurship and open science: Publication secrecy and commercial activity among Japanese and US cientists. Research Policy, 43(2), 245-260.
Yoo, C. (2015). Moore’s Law, Metcalfe’s Law, and the Theory of Optimal Interoperability. Faculty Scolarship Paper, 1651, 87-102.
Núm. 2 , Año 2018 : Julio - Diciembre
https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/download/3159/3004
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Derechos de autor 2018 Jurídicas
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv Derechos de autor 2018 Jurídicas
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Caldas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Caldas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/3159
institution Universidad de Caldas
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1836145102002585600
spelling Sobre la in-compatibilidad de la ciencia abierta con la novedad como estándar de patentabilidadOn the in-compatibility of open science with novelty as a standard of patentabilityscientific researchpatentnoveltysecrecyopen scienceinvestigación científicapatentenovedadsecretismociencia abiertaEn este trabajo nos proponemos dos objetivos: primero, exponer cómo la novedad, como requisito para la obtención de una patente, obstaculiza la realización de una ciencia abierta en términos de comunicación y uso; segundo, determinar los incentivos que llevan a la industria a optar por una ciencia abierta en los términos propuestos, dejando de lado el patentamiento. Para lograrlos, primero presentaremos los argumentos jurídicoeconómicos que llevan a considerar la patente como incentivo del desarrollo tecnocientífico, pero cómo el “efecto red” es coartado por la misma. Segundo, analizaremos el período de gracia como excepción que impide que la divulgación de la invención, previa a la solicitud de una patente, no destruya la novedad. Finalmente, estudiaremos cómo la industria acoge y alienta al software libre, caso paradigmático de la ciencia abierta, al identificar que el “efecto red” genera una utilidad superior a la de otras estrategias de producción científica.In this work two objectives are proposed: to explain how novelty, as a requirement for obtaining a patent, hinders the realization of open science regarding communication and use; and to determine the incentives that lead the industry to opt for open science in the proposed terms, leaving patenting aside. To achieve these objectives, the legaleconomic arguments that lead to consider the patent as an incentive for techno-scientific development, and how the “network effect” is restricted by those arguments, will be presented first. Secondly, the grace period is analyzed as an exception that prevents the disclosure of the invention, prior to the application for a patent, from destroying the novelty. Finally, the way the industry welcomes and encourages free software, a paradigmatic case of open science, is studied by identifying that the “network effect” generates a higher usefulness than other strategies of scientific production.Universidad de Caldas2018-07-01 00:00:002021-02-07T10:10:25Z2018-07-01 00:00:002021-02-07T10:10:25Z2018-07-01Artículo de revistaSección ArtículosJournal Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1application/pdf1794-2918https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.6https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/1586710.17151/jurid.2018.15.2.62590-8928https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/3159spa10328815JurídicasAcosta, R. (2009). Open Source Hardware. (Doctoral Dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Massachusetts.AIPPI . (2013). Informe de Síntesis de la Cuestión 233, Periodo de Gracia para Patentes. Recuperado de https://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/233/SR233Spanish.pdf.Arrow, K. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton University Press.de Beer, J. & Jain, V. (2018). Inclusive Innovation in Biohacker Spaces: The Role of Systems and Networks. Technology Innovation Management Review, 8 (2), 27.Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E.G., Anderson, M.S., Causino, N. & Louis, K.S. (1997). Withholding research results in academic life science: evidence from a national survey of faculty. Jama, 277 (15), 1224-1228.Blumenthal, D., Campbell, E.G., Gokhale, M., Yucel, R., Clarridge, B., Hilgartner, S. & Holtzman, N.A. (2006). Data withholding in genetics and the other life sciences: prevalences and predictors. Academic Medicine, 81 (2), 137-145.Boldrin, M. & Levine, D.K. (2008). Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge University Press. Botana Agra, M. (2013). Invenciones Patentables. En C. Fernández Novoa., J. M. Otero Lastres y M.Botana Agra (Eds.), Manual de la Propiedad Industrial (pp. 113-143). Madrid, España: Marcial Pons.Campbell, E.G., Clarridge, B.R., Gokhale, M., Birenbaum, L., Hilgartner, S., Holtzman, N.A. & Blumenthal, D. (2002). Data withholding in academic genetics: evidence from a national survey. Jama, 287(4), 473-480.Comisión Europea. (2016). Open Innovation, open science, open to the world: a vision for Europe. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation.Di Cola, P. (2013). Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives. Arizona Law Review, 55 (2), 301-370.Drahos, P. (2010). The global governance of knowledge: patent offices and their clients. UK: Cambridge University Press.European Patent Office (EPO). (2015). Introducing a grace period in Europe? EPO. Economic and Scientific Advisory Board.Fecher, B. & Friesike, S. (2014). Open science: One term, five schools of thought. In Opening science (pp. 17-47). Springer, Cham.Fei, X. & Wang, J. (2016). Life Science Innovation in China. National Bureau of Asian Research, 56, 1-22.Feldman, R. (2009). Plain Language Patents. Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 17, 289-304.Franzoni, C. & Scellato, G. (2010). The grace period in international patent law and its effect on the timing of disclosure. Research Policy, 39, 200-213.Gans, J.S., Murray, F.E. & Stern, S. (2013). Contracting over the disclosure of scientific knowledge: Intellectual property and academic publication (No. w19560). National Bureau of Economic Research.Graham, S. & Hegde, D. (2015). Disclosing patents’ secrets. Science, 347(6219), 236-237.Grimmelmann, J. (2010). The Internet is a semicommons. Fordham Law Review, 78(6), 2799-2842.Gupta, G., Nowatzki, T, Gangadhar, V. & Sankaralingam, K. (2017). Kickstarting Semmiconductor Innovation with Open Source Hardware. IEEE Computer Society, 50(6), 50-59.Joachim, J. (2015). Is the AIA the End of Grace: Examining the Effect of the America Invents Act on the Patent Grace Period. New York University Law Review, 90, 1293-1330.Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C. (1985). Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The American Economic Review, 75(3)Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C. (1994). Systems Competition and Network Effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2).Kim, T. & Shin, D. (2016). Social platform innovation of open source hardware in South Korea. Telematics and Informatics, 33, 217-226.Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (2004). The political economy of intellectual property law. American Enterprise Institute.Lemley, M.A. (2012). The myth of the sole inventor. Michigan Law Review, 709-760.Leydesdorff, L. & Meyer, M. (2010). The decline of university patenting and the end of the Bayh—Dole effect. Scientometrics, 83(2), 355-362.Liu, G. (2013). Visualization of patents and papers in terahertz technology: a comparative study. Scientometrics, 94 (3), 1037-1056.Lock, J. (2013). Open Source Hardware. Can embedded electronics companies thrive through the use and/or development of open source hardware? Master’s Thesis Dissertation, Chalmers University of Technology.Merges, R.P. (2012). Priority and Novelty under the AIA. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 27(2), 1023-1046.Merton, R.K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. University of Chicago Press.Nagaoka, S. & Nishimura, Y. (2015). Use of Grace Periods and Their Impact on Knowledge Flow: Evidence from Japan. RIETI Discussion Pape Series, 15-E-072.Pearce, J.M. (2016). Return on investment for open source scientific hardware development. Science and Public Policy, 43(2), 192-195.Pénin, J. (2009). On the consequences of university patenting: What can we learn by asking directly to academic inventors? (No. 2009-04). Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.Ramos Toledano, J. (2017b). Vivir del arte. mientrastanto.org. Recuperado de http://www.mientrastanto. org/boletin-155/notas/vivir-del-arte.Stallman, R. (2004). Software libre para una sociedad libre. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños. Stiglitz, J. (1999). Knowledge as a Global Public Good. En Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. & Stern, Marc A. (Ed.) Global Public Goods. New York: Oxford University Press.Stiglitz, J. (2008). Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights. Duke Law Journal, 57, 1693-1724.Sun, Y. (2003). Determinants of foreign patents in China. World Patent Information, 25(1), 27-37.Tegernsee Group, DKPTO, BMJV/DPMA, EPO, INPI, JPO, UK IPO, USPTO (2014). Consolidated Report on the Tegernsee User Consultation on Substantive Patent Law armonization.Tessensohn, J. & Yamamoto, S. (2007). Japan’s novelty grace period solves the dilemma of ‘publish and perish’. Nature Biotechnology, 25(1), 55-57.The Linux Foundation (2016). Linux Kernel Development. How Fast It is Going, Who is Doing It, What They Are Doing and Who is Sponsoring the Work.Walsh, J.P. & Huang, H. (2014). Local context, academic entrepreneurship and open science: Publication secrecy and commercial activity among Japanese and US cientists. Research Policy, 43(2), 245-260.Yoo, C. (2015). Moore’s Law, Metcalfe’s Law, and the Theory of Optimal Interoperability. Faculty Scolarship Paper, 1651, 87-102.Núm. 2 , Año 2018 : Julio - Diciembrehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/download/3159/3004Derechos de autor 2018 Jurídicashttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Wong, SulanRamos-Toledano, JoanRojas-Mora, Juliooai:repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co:ucaldas/158672024-07-16T21:50:53Z

Publicaciones similares